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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROD N. TRIPLETT, 1 
Plaintiff-Appellant, i 
- V - i 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, l 
Driver License Services, 
Department of Public Safety* i 
State of Utah, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
t Case No. 870043-CA 
t Category No. 13b 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a driver license revocation after a 
administrative hearing and a review ot the record in the Third 
District Court of Utah. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2(a)-3(2)(a)• 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether it was arbitrary and capricious for the 
bearing officer and court to rely on the proper functioning ot 
the intoxilizer machine in the absence of evidence showing the 
machine's reliability and accuracy aftqr the test in question. 
2. Whether the administrative agency and the District 
Court may rely on the intoxilyzer test results as additional 
evidence to the sworn testimony. 
3. Also, is foundation testimony that the operator is 
certified by the Department of Public Safety sutficient 
foundational testing to admit the test results? 
4. Additionally, does sworn testimony that the State's 
checklist was followed or that there was no problems with the 
machine level credibility to establish enough foundation to admit 
the machine printed test results before an administrative agency. 
STATEMENT OF TCTK ffVSE 
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding* 
The Third District Court Judgment amrmed the 
Department of Public Safety's decision to revoke the petitioner's 
driving privileges for 90 days. 
In accordance with sections 41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20 and 
based on sworn testimony and official documents, the Department 
and reviewing District Court found that* (R. p.13) 
1. The arresting officer had reasonable grounds to 
believe that the petitioner was operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol; besides 
2. The petitioner consented to an intoxilyzer test 
which gave a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .19 (T. at 4). 
3. The intoxilyzer machine was reliable and the 
results admissible before the Department, pursuant to the 
presumptions set forth in Utah Code Ann» S 41-6-44.5 and S 41-6-
44.3, and Murray Citv v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983); XacM 
n,,h t,. Utah Liauor Control Comm.. 681 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1984). 
4. That there was other substantial and competent 
evidence to support the Department's determination to revoke 
petitioner's driving privileges. 
2-
STATEMENT OF TH5 FACTS 
U.C.A# S 41-2-20 provides for a review ot the 
Department's documented records which contain the otficial DUI 
Report forms and the transcript of the sworn testimony* They 
show that: 
Rod N. Triplett (petitioner) was arrested for driving 
an automobile while under the influence of alcohol on January 19, 
1985. The arresting officer, Wright, initially stopped the 
petitioner for failing to stop at a red light. (Def. Exhibit 2 
p. 2 Addendum VI, p. A-17, Uniform DUI Report Form Sec. V., 
Defendants' Exhibit 1, Driver's License Transcript p.2). 
After Officer Wright had stopped and approached the 
petitioner's car he first detected, through the driver's open 
window, an odor of alcohol in and about the vehicle. Officer 
Wright then asked to see the petitioner's drivers license and car 
registration, which the petitioner provided in slow movements. 
After this the petitioner was asked if he had been drinking 
recently. He stated that "he had had a couple of beers," 
(Addendum VI, p. A-16, DUI Report, Def. Exhibit 1, D.L. Tran. p. 
3) . The officer also testified that he saw an open pint 
container of whiskey with approximately an ounce left in it (D.L. 
Transcript p. 3-6, DUI Report) which Mr. Triplett later "threw 
away" (Def. Exhibit 1, D.L. Transcript p. 6). Otficer Wright 
requested that the petitioner submit to field sobriety tests, to 
which petitioner consented. Otficer Wright testified tnat he and 
an additional officer, Carol McSain, saw that the petitioner was 
unable to pass the field sobriety tests as instructed (D.L. Tran. 
p. 6). 
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Based on all of the circumstances and facts testified 
to and reported, the administrator and Reviewing Court found tnat 
Officer Wright had a reasonable belief that the petitioner was 
driving under the influence of alcohol and placed him under 
arrestr and requested that he submit to an intoxilyzer test. He 
consented and agreed to the test, and was transported to the West 
Valley Police Station. 
They also found that Officer Wright was a (1) certified 
intoxilyzer machine operator (D»L. Tran. p.4) and (2) tnat he 
followed the checklist in administering the test to the driver. 
(Addendum VI, p. A-19, DUI Report Form, and Exhibit 2 Findings, 
District Court Finding No. 5, Addendum VII, p. A-23). Officer 
Wright also testified and reported in writing tnat he read the 
driver's license warnings to the petitioner prior to his taking 
the test. 
They both found, in addition that the test results 
indicated a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .19% (Intoxilyzer 
Record, Addendum VI, P. A-20 and D*L. Tran. p. 4)• 
The petitioner was notified of the department's intent 
to suspend his driving privileges and given notice of his right 
to an administrative pre-suspension hearing pursuant to Section 
41-2-19.6. He made a timely request for a hearing and one was 
conducted and documented. 
At the bearing, sworn testimony as well as documentary 
evidence was introduced including the (1) DDI Report Form, (2) 
the O.H.P. Record o£ the Intoxilyzer Test and Affidavit showing 
the machine was tested and working properly on January 15, 1985, 
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and (3) Intoxilyzer Test Record showing a stamped and printed BAC 
level of .19%. The intoxilyzer was tested and found to be 
properiy operating four days previous to petitioner1s arrest. 
Based on the evidence received at the hearing, the 
Department determined that Officer Wright had reason to believe 
tfiat the petitioner was driving while under the influence and in 
addition that there was a test result indicating a BAC of .08% or 
greater* The Department accordingly suspended his privilege to 
drive for 90 days and the Reviewing Court upheld that decision 
(Addendum VII). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
The arresting officer properly arrested the petitioner, 
Rod N. Triplett, for driving under the influence of an 
intoxicating substance* His driving pattern, the late hour, the 
odor of alcohol about his person, his admissions to drinking and 
the whiskey in the vehicle as well as his poor performance on the 
field sobriety tests all gave the officer reasonable grounds to 
arrest the driver, warn him of possible consequences to his 
driver's license, and request a chemical test. 
At the ensuing pre-suspension hearing, the Department 
of Public Safety properly took sworn testimony on the narrow 
issue before it and received and considered the documentary 
evidence presented, including the intoxilyzer test results 
obtained by a certified operator. The Department also properly 
considered the foundational intoxilyzer test record affidavit, 
showing that the machine was functioning properly four days prior 
to the subject test. The affidavit was received in the ordinary 
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course of business, regular on its face, and showed all indicia 
of trustworthiness. Therefore, a second technician's 
foundational affidavit showing that the machine was functioning 
properly after the subject test was unnecessary, illogical, and 
not legally required* The intoxilyzer machine under regulatory, 
statutory, and case law is presumed to function properly for at 
least a 40-day period, within which the petitioner's test was 
administered. 
Since the narrow scope of the civil public safety 
statute, U.C.A. § 41-2-19.6, has been met and since a second 
technician's affidavit showing the proper functioning ot the 
intoxilyzer machine after petitioner's test is not necessary or 
required} the hearing officer's decision in the administrative 
hearing should not be viewed as arbitrary or capricious, nor the 
opinion of the Reviewing Court—especially when there was 
foundational and additional sworn evidence of substance on the 
statutory issue ot "grounds to believe." 
ARGUMENT 
THE INTOXILYZER MACHINE IS LEGALLY 
PRESUMED TO FUNCTION PROPERLY AND 
FURTHER FOUNDATION IS UNNECESSARY 
IN PRACTICALITY* 
A notarized intoxilyzer atfidavit was introduced as 
part of the Department of Public Safety's Official Records at 
petitioner's pre-suspension hearing (Def. Exhibit 2, D.L, Tran. 
at 2), Utah Rules of Evidence, 803(6) and (8). This document 
shows that on January 15, 1985, four days prior to the 
petitioner's arrest and test, the intoxilyzer machine was checked 
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and found to be functioning properly. Two "breath test 
technicians" tested the machine first hand and signed the 
intoxilyzer affidavit verifying that the machine was working 
properly, therefore there was a legal foundation for any breath 
test results and the technician affidavit was admissible. ££& 
Layton City v. Bennett. p.2d
 f Ut. Ct. App. No. 87u038-CAf 
slip op. at 3 (filed July 31, 1987). 
Although this document and the operator's testimony 
show tnat the intoxilyzer machine was actually and presumably 
working properly a mere four days prior to the petitioner's test. 
This, according to the petitioner, is insutficient to support the 
suspension decision. The facts, case law, and statute however, 
clearly indicate otherwise. 
In State v. Peterson. 100 Wash. 788, 674 P.2d 1251 
(Wash. 1984), a criminal case, the Washington Supreme Court 
addressed this same issue. The defendant had submitted to a test 
tnree days after the test machine had been checked and 
calibrated, but no evidence was introduced to show that the 
machine was functioning properly after the test. But the 
Washington Supreme Court specifically ruled that such 
"bookending" of the machine test was unnecessary. 
Regulations which required breath testing machines to 
be checked and calibrated at least once every tnree months were 
significant to the Peterson court's legal reasoning. The check 
and calibration regulations existed prior to the passage of the 
DDI law under which the defendant had been charged. Thus the 
Washington Legislature was presumed to have knowledge of the 
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regulations. Additionally, the regulations went unchanged after 
passage of the new DUI law. Id. at 1253. These regulations thus 
allowed the Peterson court to find, for the purpose of criminal 
DUI prosecutions, that the legislature had created a presumption 
that the breath test machines would function properly for three 
months. 1&. at 1254. Because the test machine had been checked 
within three months prior to the defendant Peterson's test, the 
court upheld the conviction. £d. This Court should do the same. 
Utah's regulations guiding the maintenance and 
calibration of intoxilyzer machines require only tnat all 
intoxilyzer machines be checked at least once every 40 days. 
Further, these same regulations and time period were in effect 
prior to the passage ot Section 41-2-19.6. ££& Respondent's 
Brief Addendum IV. This Court can therefore presume as in 
Peterson, that the legislature had knowledge ot the 40-day 
calibration and check requirement in enacting Section 41-2-19.6. 
Logically and legally then, intoxilyzer machines in Utah are 
presumed to be functioning properly for a 40-day period, or 
between 40-day checks. 
Additional case law from the State of Oregon reiterates 
the Peterson courts'8 position that evidence concerning the 
proper calibration of a intoxilyzer machine atter each test is 
not necessary. The fact tnat this authority comes from a 
criminal proceeding in which burdens ot proot and admissibility 
of evidence are more stringent lends even more support to this 
civil proceeding. In State v. Mattna. 77 Or. App. 219, 629 P.2d 
845, 847, (Or. App. 1981) the Court said: 
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ORS 487.815(3)(c) requires that breath 
testing equipment be tested and 
certified at least every sixty days • . . 
and once the state demonstrates 
compliance with the statutory requirement/ 
it is under no obligation to show the 
condition of the equipment after its 
US£/ the presumption of validity 
extends for the 60-day period, 
(emphasis added). 
Although there is little case law which addressed the 
issue of the necessity of before and after test certxtication of 
intoxilyzer machines, the vast majority of state case law simply 
requires states to follow their own statutes and regulations 
regarding the tiae intervals for calibrating intoxilyzer 
machines. These cases either directly or indirectly focus their 
attention primarily on whether the machine was calibrated within 
the specified time period prior to a test, and didn't address the 
issue ot calibration atter a test, fuenning Yt Supert Ctt in and 
for Maricopa County. 139 Ariz. 590, 680 P.2d 121 (Ariz. 1983); 
££&£l£ V. BOWerS# 716 P.2d 471 (Colo. 1986)} State v. Liuafi. 1 
Haw. App. 625f 623 P.2d 1271 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981); flcManus v. 
SJLal£# 695 P.2d 884 (Olka. Ct. App. 1985); Murray Citv v. Hall. 
663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983), Addendum VIII. 
The petitioner argues that Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-44.3 
stands for "bookend calibrations" to insure tnat the machine was 
properxy functioning. A caretul reading of that section and the 
following subsection D.C.A. S 41-6-44.5, show tnat it really 
stanas for no such proposition. However, since the arrest was at 
0030 hours and the test results were at 0108 (Addendum VI, p. A-
16 and A-20) then suosection (1) would make the test results 
"admissible evidence" in the Driver's License "proceeding." The 
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remainder of the section, subsection (4), makes the administrator 
or judges the actual deciders of the accuracy of the test 
procedures and admissibility of the results obtained (Addendum I, 
p. A-3) • The Commissioner's Regulations, common sense, and the 
Affidavit of the equipment technicians are still only guidelines 
to the weight to be given the test results* U.C.A. S41-6-
44.5(4). 
The petitioner's sole authority in case law is Murray 
CitY Yt Ball* 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983). Murray City does not 
stand for "bookend calibrations" of an intoxilyzer machine. 
There is no mention of before and after test calibrations to 
verify proper functioning of an intoxilyzer machine. The Utah 
Supreme Court in Murray City simply allows the convenient, 
efficient, cost and time saving use ot technicians' affidavits 
tnat are not solely conclusions but relate first hand checking 
steps that were done (Addendum VII, p. A-27). In that criminal 
case the first hand attidavits are statutorily and 
constitutionally allowed to be the sole foundation for a test 
result that may be rebutted by the defendant (Addendum ViII, p. 
A-28) • The driver in this case may also subpoena witnesses as 
well, (U.C.A. S 41-2-19.5(5) Addendum I, p. A-l) but choose not 
to. 
In the absence of any case law requiring bookend 
calibrations of an intoxilyzer machine, subsequent calibrations 
or tests are legally and practically unnecessary especially 
absent a showing that the machine or the test results are somehow 
not trustworthy on this test. The practical and legal 
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presumption of accuracy and reliability of an intoxilyzer machine 
is maintained by a pre-test calibration alone. 
•Necessity," (Murray City). and experience! as well as 
logic and the universally accepted design and acceptance of the 
machine (Murray, Addendum VIII, p. A-26) dictates these 
presumptions. Legally, a pre-suspension hearing requested 
pursuant to Section 41-2-19.6 is required within 30 days after 
the arrest. That 30-day requirement facilitates the statutory 
purpose of quickly removing dangerous drivers from the road. 
U.C.A. S 41-2-19.5. It also may help the innocent driver by 
disposing ot the matter quickly so that he or she may swiftly re-
obtain the license rather than continue to use the temporary 
permit. Practically, in almost all civil hearings such as this 
one, a second "bookend" breath test machine attidavit will not be 
available at the time of the bearing. Thus, logic and legal 
necessity also require tnat the presumption of accuracy be 
accorded tests from machines checked within a 40-day period. 
As a practical consideration this machine and others 
are all used by "certified operators." That means they have 
taken hours of training and had practical experience with the 
machines and the subjects. This operator not only testified that 
he was certified but also marked on his DUI Report that the usual 
checklist recommended by the manufacturer and the Commissioner 
were used (Exhibit 2, DUI Report p. 4). The operator-otficer, as 
well as the hearing examiner have the experience and common 
knowledge that the machine will not print the results or show an 
error indicator light if the machine is not functioning 
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accurately* In fact, training, experience, and the knowledge is 
that the machines are mechanically designed and built to show any 
malfunction at the test (Addendum IV and V, p. A-ll). There is 
an error light on all machines (Addendum II, p. A-4 and A-5). 
Thereroref absent any proot to the contrary, realistically it is 
a common known fact tftat preponderates that the machine and the 
results printed are extremely reliable. This Court should also 
uphold that practical presumption made by the designers, 
manufacturers, Commissioner, and users of this valuable tooll 
The Department Records and Transcript of the sworn 
testimony were that this test was done by a (1) certified 
operator and (2) the State's checklist was followed (Def. Exnibit 
2, and D.L. Tran. p. 4)• In Colorado, the Appeals Court presumes 
a departmental prima facie case if there is a checklist used, 
Anltman v. M.V.D.« 706 P.2d 5, 6 (Colo. App. 1985). Even absent 
a documented checklist or testimony tnat it was used, the fact 
that the test was done by a certified operator led the Colorado 
Court to say: 
We agree with the holdings in State v. 
RuZh, 595 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. App. 1980), and, 
accordingly, hold that the burden is not 
on the state in a case of this kind (a 
driver's license revocation) to establish 
by a current inspection and certitication 
that a breath testing device pertormed 
accurately; see also State Dept. of 
Public Safety v. Habischr 313 N.w.2d 13 
(Minn. 1981)• 
The Court then later in Malone v. Colo. Deot. of Motor Vehicles. 
707 P.2d 363, 364 (Colo. App. 1985) statedi 
When there is evidence that a breath 
testing device is operated by one certified 
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to use it and that the test is administered 
in accordance with division of health 
regulations, a prima facie case for the 
introduction of breath test results is 
established, (citation omitted). 
We hold tnat this testimony is 
sufficient to support the hearing officers 
decision, even in the absence of the 
operational checklist. (Emphasis added). 
Therefore, even absent a checklist or a technician's 
testing affidavit, the fact that the uncontradicted testimony was 
that the results were obtained by a certified operator should 
establish * a prima facie case for the introduction of breath 
test results.• 
In this case, the test machine was obviously and 
unrefutably checked just four days prior to the test at issue. 
It was checked well within the 40 days allowed by the 
regulations. Because the machine was checked within this 40-day 
period, it was functioning in all legal, logical, and practical 
senses when the appellant's breath sample was taken. Since the 
intoxilyzer machine is legally and practically presumed to be 
functioning properly at the time of the appellant's test, the 
Department and District Court could therefore rely on the .19% 
BAC results in suspending the appellant's license. 
POINT II 
THE HEARING OFFICER WAS NOT ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS IN REVOKING PETITIONERS 
DRIVING PRIVILEGES. 
The petitioner bases his argument concerning the 
arbitrary and capricious manner in which the hearing otficer and 
the District Court suspended his license, solely on the hearing 
examiner's refusal to require before and after test affidavits 
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verifying the proper functioning of the intoxilyzer machine. 
(Appeal Brief and Docketing Statement). 
Arbitrary seems to mean "with no basis at all," and 
capricious means "on a whim." (Websters Dictionary). However, 
the Administrative Examiner and the District Court had 
substantial "evidence of substance" showing the arresting otticer 
had grounas to believe the appellant had been driving while under 
the influence. Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 
658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983). 
It was a narrow issue. The testimony and documents of 
a driving pattern, admissions, personal observations, field 
sobriety tests, all in addition to the corroborating, trustwortny 
test results, certainly cannot and should not be deemed to be 
unreliable by this Court. Nor would reason, logic, or common 
sense dictate to this Court tftat the Administrative Examiner or 
the District Court was arbitrary and capricious. 
CONCLUSION 
The hearing otticer was not arbitrary and capricious in 
retusing to consider "bookend affidavits" since it is not 
required by the regulations governing such matters. Tnere is no 
case law or statute that purports to hold such a view. 
Additionally, the idea would be administratively cumbersome and 
expensive, in the absence ot a contrary showing of unreliability. 
The respondent, Department of Public Safety, Driver 
License Division theretore respectfully requests that this Court 
arrlrm the trial court and specitically reattirm tnat bookend 
technician's affidavits to demonstrate a foundation to the 
14-
accuracy ot an intoxilyzer machine is practically unnecessary and 
not required by law. 
DATED this /(S day ot August, 1987. 
DAVID L LKINSON 
neral 
M. BALE 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILIHB 
I hereby certify tnat four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief ot Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. Metropolitan Law Building, 431 South 300 
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ADDENDUM I 
Motor Vehicle Statutes Emphasized 
safety hazards by driving with a blood alcohol 
content above a certain level or while under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of 
alcohol and any drug or by refusing to take a che-
mical test that complies with the requirements of 
section 41444.10. tm 
41-M9.6. Chemical lest - Groaads aad 
procedure for officer's request • Taking Kcease 
• Report to departmeat • Procedure by 
department • Suspension. 
. (1) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds 
to believe that a person may be violating or has 
violated section 414-44 the peace officer may, in 
connection with his arrest of the person, request the 
person to submit to a chemical test to be administ-
ered in compliance with the standards set forth in 
section 41444.10. 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior 
to the person's submission to a chemical test that 
results indicating .OS9?* or more by weight of alcohol 
in the blood shall, and the existence of a blood 
alcohol content sufficient to render the person inc-
apable of safely driving a vehicle can, result in sus-
pension or revocation of the person's license or 
privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
(3) If the person submits to that chemical test 
and the results indicate a blood alcohol content of 
.08Vt or more, or it the officer makes a determina-
tion, based on reasonable grounds to believe that 
the determination is correct, that the person is oth-
erwise in violation of section 41-6-44, the officer 
directing administration of the test or making the 
determination shall serve on the person, on behalf 
of the department, immediate notice of the depart-
ment's intention to suspend the person's privilege 
or license to drive. If the officer serves that imme-
diate notice on behalf of the department he shall 
take the Utah driver license or certificate or permit, 
if any, of the driver, issue a temporary license eff-
ective for only 30 days, and supply to the driver, on 
a form to be approved by the department, basic 
information regarding how to obtain a prompt 
hearing before the department. A citation issued by 
the officer may, if approved as to form by the 
department, serve also as the temporary license. 
(4) The peace officer serving the notice shall 
send to the department within five days after the 
date of arrest and service of the notice the person's 
license along with a copy of the citation issued reg-
arding the offense, and a sworn report indicating 
the chemical test results, if any, and any other basis 
for the officer's determination that the person has 
violated section 41444, and the officer's belief 
regarding the person's violation of section 414-
44. Each such report shall be on a form approved 
by the department and shall be endorsed by the 
police chief or his equivalent or by a person autho-
rized by him, other than the officer serving the 
notice. 
(5) Upon written request of a person who has 
been issued a 30-day license, the department shall 
grant to the person an opportunity to be heard 
within 30 days after the date of arrest and issuance 
of the 30-day license, but the request must be 
made within 10 days of the date of the arrest and 
issuance of the 30-day license. A hearing, if held, 
shall be before the department in the county in 
which the arrest occurred, unless the department 
and the person agree that the hearing may be held in 
some other county. The hearing shall be docume-
nted and its scope sb^]| cover the issues of whether a 
peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the 
*£L\£* Far ANNOTATIONS, coasah I 
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person to have been operating a motor vehicle in 
violation of section 41444, whether the person 
refused to submit to the test, and the test results. If 
any. In connection with a hearing the department or 
its duly authorized agent may administer, oaths and 
may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses 
and the production of relevant books and papenT" 
One or more members of the department may 
conduct the hearing, and any decision made after a 
hearing before any dumber of the members of the 
department shall be as valid as if made after « 
hearing before the full membership of the depart-
ment. After the hearing, the department shall order, 
either that the person's license or privilege to drive 
be suspended or that it not be suspended. A first 
suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under 
this subsection, shall be for a period of 90 days, . 
beginning on the 31st day after the date of the 
arrest. A second or subsequent suspension under 
this subsection shall be for a period of 120 days, 
beginning on the 31st day after the date of arrest. 
The department shall assess against a person, in 
addition to any fee imposed under subsection 41-2-
8(7), a fee of S25, which must be paid before the 
person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover 
administrative costs, and which fee shall be canceled 
if the person obtains an unappealed department-
hearing or court decision that the suspension was 
not proper. A person whose license has been susp-
ended by the department under this subsection may 
file a petition within 30 days after the suspension 
for a hearing in the matter which, if held, shall be 
governed by the provisions of section 41-2-20. tfas 
41-2-20. Judicial review of license cancellation, 
revocation or suspension • Scope of review. 
Any person denied a license or whose license his 
been canceled, suspended or revoked by the depar-
tment except where such cancellation or revocation 
is mandatory under the provisions of this act unless 
the suspension occurred pursuant to section 41-2-
19.6 shall have the right to file a petition within 
thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in 
a court of record in the county wherein such person 
shall reside and such court is hereby vested with 
jurisdiction and it shall be its duty to set the matter 
for hearing upon ten days' written notice to the 
department. The court's jurisdiction is limited to a 
review of the record to determine whether or not the 
department's decision was arbitrary or capricious. 
•1VS3 
41-2-21. New license after revocation. 
(1) Any person whose license has been revoked 
under this act shall not be entitled to apply for or 
receive any new license until the expiration of one 
year from the date such former license was revoked 
or longer as provided in sections 41-2-18 and 41-
2-19. Licenses which have been revoked may not 
be renewed, but application for a new license must 
be filed as provided in section 41-24, and a 
license so issued shall be subject to all of the prov-
isions of an original license. The department shall 
not grant the license until jsn investigation of the 
character, abilities and habits' of the driver has been 
made to indicate whether it will be safe to again 
grant him the privilege of using the highways.. *< 
(2) Any resident or nonresident whose oper-
ator's license to operate a motor vehicle in this state 
has been suspended or revoked as provided in this 
act shall not operate a motor vehicle in this state 
under a license, permit, or registration certificate 
issued by any other jurisdiction or otherwise during 
such suspension or after such revocation until a new 
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*' or drag - Refusnl to allow - Warning, report, 
v
 revocation of neense - Court actio* on revocation • 
Person Incapable of refusal - Results of test available -
' Who may give lest - Evidence. 
411-6-44.20. Drinking alcoholic hevemge tad ope* 
containers In motor vehicle prohibited • Definitions -
. Exception* . Penalty for violation. 
411-6-44 JO. Sdrure and impoundment of vehicles by , 
category 1 peace officer*. * 
4114-45. Reckless drlvlag * Penalty. 
411-6-43. Local ordinance* fo be consistent with 
code. 
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority 
that governs a person's driving or being in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having 
alcohol in the blood or while under the influence of 
alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of 
alcohol and any drug, or that governs, in relation to 
any of those matters, the use of a chemical test or 
chemical tests, or evidentiary presumptions, or 
penalties or that governs any combination of those 
matters, shall be consistent with the provisions in 
this code which govern those marten. 
,"'". (2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority 
/&?/ £&Per/?j /erk)&j &?>?/?& &r ds?y}#£ * vMcte }/? 
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons 
or property shall be consistent with the provisions of 
Ibis code which govern those matters.
 v /
 !w» 
41-6-43.10. Repealed. ' ' ' .'* * ym 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol 
or drug or with high blood alcohol content • 
Criminal punishment - Arrest without warrant 
• Suspension or revocation of license. 
(1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in 
this section for any person with a blood alcohol 
content of .08 ^ ii or greater by weight, or who is 
under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the 
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree which renders the person incapable of safely 
driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this state. The fact that a 
person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug does 
not constitute a defense against, any charge of viol-
ating this section. . " ^ 
1
 (2) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall 
be based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred 
cubic centimeters of blood. ;: ' 
(3Xa) Every person who is convicted the first rime 
of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B 
J7»j3t/7>£27>£>rt' )mp7?S£>2>J7>t/» J>>£) bt Jl>? JW>/ ft Wf7 
than 60 days. But if the person has inflicted a bodily 
injury upon another as a proximate result of having 
operated the vehicle in a negligent manner, he is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor; any imprisonment 
in the county jail shall be for not more, than one 
year. '.•...->; <"< -.. r,\ \ 
(b) For the purposes of this section, the stan-
dard of negligence is that Of simple negligence, the 
failure to exercise that degree of care which an 
ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises 
under like or similar circumstances. '. '' '' .'* 
(4) In addition to the penalties provided in Subs-
ection (3), the court shall, upon a fust conviction, 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 
consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with 
VTAHCODE 
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emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or 
require the person to work in a cxmim unity-service 
Work program for not less than 24 hours nor more 
than 50 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence 
Or the work in the community-service work 
Program, order the person to participate in an ass-
essment and educational series at.a licensed alcohol 
rehabilitation facility. 
. (5Xt) Upon a second conviction within five yean 
tfier a first conviction under this section or under a 
fecal ordinance similar to this section adopted in 
compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court 
shall, in addition to the penalties provided for in 
Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jafl sentence of 
not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 
?20 hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk 
tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a 
Community-service work program for not less than 
&0 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition 
to the jail sentence or the work in the community-
Service work program, order the person to partici-
pate in an assessment and educational series at a 
licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. The court 
ttiay, in its discretion, order the person to obtain 
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. . .,. 
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five 
years after a second conviction under this section or 
Under a local ordinance similar to this section 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-
45(1), the court shall, in addition to the penalties 
Provided for in Subsection (3), impose a mandatory 
Jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 
}, 160 hours with emphasis on serving in the .drunk 
tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a 
Community-service work project .for not-less than 
«U0 nor more than 720 hours and, in addition to the 
iail sentence or work in the community-service 
work program, order the person to obtain treatment 
•4 an alcohol rehabilitation facility. ....... i •
 :-,~. 
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under 
Subsection (3) may be suspended and the convicted 
Person is not eligible for parole or probation until 
*ny sentence imposed under this section has been 
*erved. Probation or parole resulting from a convi-
ction for a violation of this section or a local ordi-
nance similar to this section adopted in compliance 
with Subsection 41-6-43(1) may not be \ terminated 
*nd the department may not reinstate aay license 
Suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction, 
if it is a second or subsequent conviction within five 
years, until the convicted person has furnished evi-
dence satisfactory to the department that all fines 
*nd fees, including fees for restitution and rehabil-
itation costs, assessed against the person, have bees 
P a i d . . . . .% ' V r r . .-*•»«, * , . V. 
. (6Xa) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5) 
*h*t require z. sentencing court Co order € coavicUfd 
Person to participate in an assessment and educati-
onal series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation {ap-
Uty, obtain, in the discretion of the court, treatment 
*4 an alcohol rehabilitation facility/ Qr '.obtain* 
Mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation 
facility, or do any combination of those things, 
*pply to a conviction for a violation of Section. 41-
$-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subs-
ection (7), so as to require the court to render the 
*ame order regarding education or treatment at an 
*Jcohol rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection 
Vith a first, second, or subsequent conviction under 
Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense 
Under Subsection (7), as he woulfl render in cbnne: 
*tion with applying respectively, the first, second, or 
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subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections 
41-6-44(4) and (5). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a 
conviction under Section 41-6-45 which qualified 
as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is a first, 
second, or subsequent conviction under this subse-
ction, a previous conviction under either Section 41-
644 or 41-645 Is deemed a prior conviction. 
Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any com-
munity-b*sed or other education program provided 
for in this section shall be approved by the Depart-
ment of Social Services. '« • .* V 
(7Xa) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of 
guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of 
Section 41-645 or of an ordinance enacted pur-
suant to Subsection 41 -643(b) in satisfaction of, 
or as a substitute for, an original charge of a viol-
ation of this section, the prosecution shall state for 
the record a factual basis for the plea, including 
whether or not there had been consumption of 
alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant in connection with the offense. The stat-
ement shall be an offer of proof of the facts which 
shows whether. or not there was consumption of 
alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant, in connection with the offense. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before 
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of 
the consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-
45 as follows: If the court accepts the defendant's 
plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of violating 
Section 41-645, and the prosecutor states for the 
record that there was consumption of alcohol or 
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant 
in connection with the offense, the resulting convi-
ction is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsec-
tion (5). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of 
each conviction of Section 41-645 which is a 
prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5). 
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest 
a person for a violation of this section when the 
officer has probable cause to believe the violation 
has occurred] although not in his presence, and if 
the officer has probable cause to believe that the 
violation was committed by the person. . • * 
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend 
for 90 days the operator's license of any person 
convicted for the first time under Subsection (1), 
and shall revoke for one year the license of any 
person otherwise convicted under this section, except 
that the department may subtract from any suspe-
nsion period the number of days for which a license 
was previously suspended under Section 41-2-19.6 
if the previous suspension was based on the same 
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is 
based. . ms 
41-644.2. Repealed. my 
41444 J . Standards for chemical breath analysis 
-Evidence. 
* (1) The commissioner of public safety shall esta-
blish standards for the administration and interpre-
tation of chemical analysis of a person's breath 
including standards of training. 
• ~ (2) In any action or proceeding in which it is 
material to prove that a person was driving or in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or driving with a blood alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as 
memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events 
to prove that the analysis was made and the instru-
ment used was accurate, according to standards 
established in subsection (1) shall be admissible if: 
(a) The judge finds that they were made in 
the regular course of the investigation at or about 
the time of the act, condition or event; and 
(b) The source of information from which 
made and the method and circumstances of their 
preparation were such as to indicate their trustwor-
thiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards establ-
ished under subsection (1) and the conditions of 
subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption 
that the test results are valid and further foundation 
for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary n o 
41444.5. Admissibility of chemical test results la 
actions for driving aoder the influence or with a 
prohibited blood alcohol contest - Weight. 
(1) In any action or proceeding in which it is 
material to prove that a person was driving or in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or with a blood alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical test 
or tests as authorized in section 41-644.10 shall 
be admissible as evidence. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken within two. 
hours of the alleged driving or actual physical 
control, the blood alcohol level of the person at the 
time of the alleged driving or actual physical control 
shall be presumed to be not less than the level of the 
alcohol determined to be in the blood by the chem-
ical test. 
(3) If the chemical test was taken more than 
two hours after the alleged driving or actual physical 
control, the test result shall be admissible as evid-
ence of the person's blood alcohol level at the time 
of the alleged driving or actual physical control, but 
the trier of fact shall determine what weight shall be 
given to the result of the test. 
(4) The foregoing provisions of this section 
shall not prevent a court from receiving otherwise 
admissible evidence, as to a defendant's blood 
alcohol level at the time of the alleged driving or 
actual physical control. Has 
41-644.8. Municipal attorneys authorized to 
prosecute for driving while license suspended or 
revoked. 
Alleged violations of section 41-2-28, which 
consist of the person driving while his operator's or 
chauffeur's license is suspended or revoked for a 
violation of section 41-644, a local ordinance 
which complies with the requirements of section 41-
6-43, section 41-644.10. section 76-5-207, or 
a criminal prohibition that the person was charged 
with violating as a result of a plea bargain after 
having been originally charged with violating one or 
more of those sections or ordinances, may be pros-
ecuted by attorneys of cities and towns as well as by 
prosecutors who are empowered elsewhere in this 
code to prosecute those alleged violations. ms 
41-644.10. Implied consent to chemical tests tor 
alcohol or drug - Refusal to allow • Warning, 
report, revocation of license • Court action on 
revocation - Person incapible of refusal -
Results of test available • Who may five test • 
Evidence. 
(1) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this 
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine 
for the purpose of determining whether he was 
driving or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statu-
torily prohibited, or while under the influence of 
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Manufacturers and U.H.P. Intoxiiyzer Pictures With Labels 
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Excerpts From Manufacturers Operators Manual 
INTOXILYZER 











MODEL 4011A and 4011AS 
DESCRIPTION 
The CMI INTOXILYZER is designed to be operated at 115 
Volts/60Hz AC, but may be ordered with an international 
option. The instrument requires approximately 250 
watts of power. 
The heart of the INTOXILYZER, the sample cell, utilizes 
a technique called "infrared absorption". Infrared 
light from a highly stabilzed light source is modu-
lated, then collimated by fused silica lenses and 
directed through the sample cell. Every molecule ab-
sorbs light of a specific wave length depending on the 
physical size ana structure of that molecule. The 
INTOXILYZER measures alcohol in breath by detecting the 
decrease in intensity of infrared energy passing 
through the breath sample. At the other end of the 
cell," a second set of fused silica optics focuses the 
energy onto the face of an infrared detector. As the 
concentration of alcohol vapor increases in the cell, 
the amount of infrared energy reaching the detector 
falls in a predictable, exponential manner. 
The signal detected is electronically filtered at the 
source modulation frequency, and then is processed and 
converted from an AC to a DC signal. This DC analogue 
signal, which is a representation of the exponential 
relationship between the energy transmitted through the 
cell and the concentration of alcohol in the cell* is 
linearized by a signal processing unit, and then digi-
tized and displayed on a digital panel meter directly 












TABLE 1: CONTROLS & INDICATORS 
No. Item 
1 Power Switch 
2 Power Indicator 
3 Ready Indicator 
4 Cycle Complete 
Indicator 
5 Breath Strength 
Indicator 
6 Error Indicator 
LED * Light Emitting Diode 
Description 
A two position toggle 
switch that applies AC 
power to the instrument 
when set on "on". 
A yellow LED that lights 
when the power switch is 
in the "on" position. 
A green LED that lights 
when the sample cell has 
been heated to the proper 
temperature. 
A yellow LED that lights 
when the proper timing 
cycles have been com-
pleted in the Air Blank, 
Breath, and Calibrate 
test positions of the 
Mode Selector Switch. 
A green lamp that lights 
when a proper breath 
sample is being given. 
A red LED that lights 
when the operator has not 
properly oper- ated the 
instrument. 
A<\ 
BREATH SAMPLING SYSTEM 
INTOXILYZER 4011A and 4011AS utilize a breath sampling 
system which allows individuals of varying lung capa-
city to easily corplete a test. This system looks at 
the rate of rise of the digital readout as the person 
under test is blowing into the instrument to ascertain 
the wdeep lung" nature of the breath sample. The per-
son under test must light the green breath lamp for a 
minimum of 3 1/2 to 4 seconds and continue blowing 
until a level readout has been reached in order for the 
instrument to print. The end result is a system that 
is both tamperproof and easier to use, in that it 
covers much more effectively, the broad range of lung 
capacities found in subjects under test. As such, test 
time will vary from 4 to 5 seconds for a small lunged 
individual and up to 10 to 15 seconds for a large 
lunged individual. Average test time is 7 seconds. 
The capability of the INTOXILYZER to instantaneously 
analyze the breath of the person under test makes this 
system possible, indeed allowing one to obtain a more 
"human factored" breath sample. The officer need 
merely tell the subject to take a deep breath and blow. 
"S" OPTION 
The INTOXILYZER Model 4011AS is a technical answer to 
the question of acetone sensitivity in an infrared 
instrument which analyzes breath alcohol in the 3.39 
micron absorption band. 
The Model 4011AS is a standard Model 4011A INTOXILYZER 
which has been manufactured with the "S" option. All 
operating controls and procedures are identical to 
those of the Model 4011A. The only outward indication 
of the "S" option is the addition of a red front panel 




Utah Department of Public Safety Operators Manual Excerpts 
CHAPTER VIII 
INTOXILYZER OPERATION! 
The Intoxilyzer was first produced in 1972 by Omicron Corporation from 
California. It was purchased by CMI Corporation of Colorado who perfected and 
now produce it. 
The CMI Intoxilyzer offers law enforcement agencies a practical aid in 
their fight against the nation1s leading causes of highway fatalities-the 
drinking driver. 
It is an answer to many of the problems previously encountered by other 
breath testing instruments. 
The Intoxilyzer is: 
Quick and easy to operate. 
It is safe to operate because the operator does not have to handle 
any chemicals. 
It gives a permanent record. 
It has an established legal record. 
It is highly reliable because it is tamper proof. J^^S^JBJ^^ 
procedi^^ "^ ""~~" ^-—-
There is nothing magical about the way the Intoxilyzer works. Its design 
is based on sound Chemico-Physical Law. 
Very simply—it operates on what is called an Infrared Absorption Process 
which means that alcohol laden breath is introduced into a chamber and 
infrared light is passed through it. The instrument computes how much light 
has been absorbed and reads it out on a digital display. 
CMI INTOXILYZER 
Model 4011AS and 4011AS+A 
DESCRIPTION 
The CMI Intoxilyzer is designed to be operated at 115 Volts/60Hz AC, but may 
be ordered with an international option. The instrument requires approxi-
mately 250 watts of power. 
The heart of the Intoxilyzer, the sample cell, utilizes a technique called 
"infrared absorption11. Infrared light from a highly stabilized light source 
is modulated, then collimated by fused silica lenses and directed through the 
sample cell. Every molecule absorbs light of a specific wave length depending 
on the physical size and structure of that molecule. The INTOXILYZER measures 
alcohol in breath by detecting the decrease in intensity of infrared energy 
passing through the breath sample. At the other end of the cell, a second set 
of fusea silica optics focuses the energy onto the face of an infrared 
-65-
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detector. As the concentration of alcohol vapor increases in the cell, the 
amount of infrared energy reaching the detector falls in a predictable, 
exponential manner. 
The signal detected is electronically filtered at the source modulation 
frequency, and then is processed and converted from an AC to a DC signal. 
This DC analogue signal, which is a representation of the exponential 
relationship between the energy transmitted through the cell and the 
concentration of alcohol in the cell, is linearized by a signal processing 
unit, and then digitized and displayed on a digital panel meter directly as 
per cent blood alcohol. 
The INT0XILY2ER Model 4011 AS has four operational modes: 
1. Zero Set 
2. Air Blank 
3. Breath 
4. Calibrate 
In this mode, the operator adjusts the Zero 
Adjust Knob until the digital panel reads a 
positive .000, .001, .002, or .003. 
When the internal air pump is connected to the 
breath tube, the sample cell is cleared auto-
matically. 
This mode is used when a subject is tested 
for alcohol in his breath. 
When the operator wishes to check the instrument 
against a standard alcohol solution, the internal 
pump is connected to the input of a simulator con-
taining this solution, and the breath tube is 
connected to the output of the simulator. In 
Calibrate Mode, the air pump will fill the sample 
cell with the reference vapor. (Refer to special 
instructions accompanying the "Beam Attenuator" 




Utah Breath Testing Regulations Excerpts 
Archives file #3531 
BREATH TESTING KEGUIATIONS 
Revised: April 1, 1981 
Archives f1le# 4714 
Revised: November 4,,1983" 
Archives f1le# 6734 
DEPARTMENT Of VUBLK SAFETY 
* ComliiiontA. 
A 13 
TESTS FOR CHECKING CALIBRATION 
A. Breath testing instruments must be certified on a routine basis 
not to exceed forty (40) days. 
B. Calibration tests must be performed by a technician using appropri-
ate solutions of ethyl alcohol, and using methods and techniques for 
checking calibration recommended by the manufacturer of the 
instrument or the office of the Commissioner of Public Safety. 
C. Results of test for calibration shall be kept in a permanent record 
book. A report of each calibration test shall be recorded on the 
appropriate form and sent to the supervisor of the Breath Testing 
Program. The supervisor of the Breath Testing Program is hereby 
designated as the official keeper of said records. 
PROCEDURE FOR CERTIFICATION OF INSTRUMENTS 
A . Breathalyzer 
1 . Instrument heating properly: 
a . between 47 and 53 degrees centigrade 
2. Collection chamber output: 
a . COLD between 55 and 58 cc's 
b. WARM between 50 and 54 cc"s 
3. NULL meter functioning properly: 
a . Must be able to achieve a balance and swing freely in both 
directions. 
A m 
INTOXILYZER - BREATHALYZER OPERATOR TRAINING 
A . Training for original certification is to be conducted by a Breath 
Test Technician and should include the following: 
1 hour.. .Welcome, registration, preview of Alcohol and Traffic Safety. 
3 hours. .Effects of Alcohol in the Human Body. 
3 hours. .Operational Principles of Breath Testing. 
2 hours..Alcoholic Influence Report Form. 
2 hours..Testimony of the Arresting Officer. 
3 hours. .Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing. 
1 hour. . .Detecting the Drinking Driver. 
8Xhours..Laboratory Participation. (Running Simulator tests on the 
instruments and tests on actual drinking subjects). 
1 hour.• .Examination and Critiques of Course. 
3 V Ho^K PASS 
B. Training for recertification is to be conducted by a Breath Testing 
Technician and should include the following: 
2 hours. .Effects of alcohol in the Human Body. 
2 hours. .Operational principles of Breath Testing. 
1 hour.. .Alcohol Influence Report Form and Testimony of arresting officer. 
2 hours..Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing and Detecting and the 
Drinking Driver. 
1 hour . . .Exam. 
C. Anyone having previously successfully completed a twenty-four (24) 
hour operators school, may be recertified at anytime by successfully 
completing an eight (8) hour recertification course, and also may be 
certified to operate another type of breath testing instrument after 
eight (8) hours instruction pertaining to the instrument in question. 
A 1ST 
ADDENDUM VI 
DUI Report Form and Intoxilyzer Results Printout Card 
II. 
III. 
DUI REPORT FORM 
CASE IDENTIFICA 
Date /./£? 
I I JION: ^ 
-ft* D|y &&f 
Subject's Name /»& AJ. -TZ/St&r-
Accldent_ Case #j£5~Z**f!j&_Time Prepared. 
Place of Employment (/*/***/ /tofsfsff_^ . 
Home Telephone Number «P3T9~ %/^40 
D.O.B. ' / ? - 3A ^ ^ Driver License * 
Place nf Arrest <^»/9>J g X ^ S 
Address - f l k g ^ g ^ f t g g 
Address 
/hAAjjy* 
Arresting Officer {jJAyAAtr 
Arresting Agency (jJfxr ifayj^j 
Y& 
work Telephone Numoer 
/VfrfS7¥/3~T\mi> of Arrest 
Charges ^ / / > / £ - £ 
* f i 3 A 
Assisting Officers. 
VEHICLE: 
Year /ffi?^ Color__ 
License* and state $S£ %£$ 
Registered Owner, 
A ^ 
*fc A Make. Model. 
^ > ? S 
Disposition / / w A tf^/h£& 
9*4 
Address .C5~<^9 S / /S/3 *^ 
WITNESSES: (If passengers, indicate specifically) 










IV. ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL 
The facts establishing the subject's actual physical control of a motor vehicle arerr 
V. DRIVING PATTERN: / 
Subject's location when first observed wen** Bcto* 
The facts observed r/garding driving pattern: <ij^>/^f'r' £XUJ 
Time: AtolR 
\6 e <S£*£u/ f/c£) U&i 
VI. PRE-ARREST STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT: 
fJDriGj/ **J& /;«, HM, &AJ4S**J-S*>^ ? 
VII. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: 
Odor of alcoholic beverage i/i^S 
Speech f y ourt^h 
Balance feti/,. 
Signs or complaints of injury or illness lUO 
Other physical characteristics /^S^&h>. 4)/ t . t . /AJ MUs/AT- TTZAJ^J: &),,£^ jfe* 
&X&-
A ft* 
UK FIELOSOBRIETY TESTS: (Describe subject's actions) 
1. ^ M t f < ^ - fifitrt &UAJA{£. for a/>£+*jjL!A &/££> . T&ac+isb 0/&jttr M/te*i yh 
Ykyee* JOT- dt/6 &$,**<?- - &*1fi<LT AM- *>*l «*f=/ *S AiA&r 7 7 / 7 ^ - &*+uk 
Were tests demonstrated by nfficer? J/fi-& Subject's ability to follow Instructions FAI£- - A<JX?A 
IX. SEARCHES 
A. Vehicle: 
Was subject's vehicle searched? Where?. 
When? Evidence 
Person who performed the search , 
B. Subject: 
Was subject's person seached? Where?. 
When? Evidence Found 
Person who performed the search -
X. ytfFTSMICAL TESTJ A&tmCA  EST§>-
0 / o r Mrs. i/£JP t&rT*'' do you understand that you are under arrest for 
driving under the influence of alchohol (drugs)? Response, (if any) / / a f t fiP fJ^cSf\ 
I hereby request that you submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol (drug) content of your 
blood. I request that you take a A^C^^rrr- test. 
(blood-breath-urine) 
£3- The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was 
administered: 
Results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the 
existence of a blood alcohol content or presence of drugs sufficient to render you 
incapable of safely driving a vehicle can, result in suspension or revocation of your 
license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
Is your response to my request that you submit to a chemical test? Response:/ PG/JT' U^tjg 
mo e*j +*& 0/^ k^f\<M<*j? . 
Did subject submit to a chemical test? ! /#?> Type of test /5<££#rM 
Test Administered by .fc}*j6af VC& Where? tOt &#?7B*iJ 
When? A/fitf Results * / ^ 3 Was subject notified of results? 
rf-
(If the subject refuses the test, read the following) 
The following admonition was given by me to the subject: 
If you refuse the test, It will not be given, however I must warn you that If you refuse, 
your license or permit to drive a motor vehicle can be revoked for one year with no 
provision for a limited driver's license. After you have taken this test, you will be 
permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer a test at your own expense, 
In addition to the one I have requestad you to submit to, so long as it does no delay the 
lest or tests requested by me. Upon your request, I will make available to you the results 
of the test if you take it. 
A n 
•M-
(IT me suojeci claims me ngnx 10 remain snent or me ngm to counsel, reao me Toiiowmg:) 
The following admonition was given by me to the subject: 
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent 
law which is civil In nature and separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain 
silent does not give you the right to refuse to take the test. You do not have the right to 
have counsel during the test procedure. Unless you submit to the test I am requesting, I 
will consider that you have refused to take the test. I warn you that if you refuse to take 
the test, your driver's license can be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited 
license. 
XL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: 
Was subject advised of the following rights? i/££ When? ~0//9 
By Whom? ff, tdf/fnt'T Where? {» V OAIJAJLI 
__jbfiTYou have the right to remain silent. 
**<£ Anything you say can and will be used against you In a court of law. 
>u have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being 
questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you 
before any questioning, If you wish one. 
If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop 
answering questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during 
questioning. 
Were the following waiver questions asked? 
1^ 1. Do you understand each ol these rights I have explained to you? 
Response fr^, r&ny mutif 
Having these rights In mind, do you wish to talk to us now? 
Response 
INTERVIEW: 
Were you operating a vehicle? 
Where were you going? 
What street or highway were you on?. 
Direction of travel? 
Where did you start from? 
When? What time is It now? 
What is today's date? Date of week? 
(Actual time Date Day 7 s ZXJ 
What city or county are you In now? P fe ^ 
Have you been drinking? 
What? How much? 
Where? 
When did you have your first drink? , Last drink? 












Are you taking tranquilizers, pills, medicines or drugs of any kind? 
(What kind? get sample) 
When did you have the last dose? 
Are you III? 
(If subject was in an accident, ask these questions:) 
Were you Involved in an accident today? 
Have you had any alcoholic beverage or drugs since the accident? 




Kit. OTHER OCCURRENCES OR FACTS: 
))AS/AJ* SfSssJi «)~<L dl&A^j t>Ajrst_ AJA*±) . .__ 
(III. ATTACHED DOCUMENTS 
I have attached the following documents to this report: 
1. fe^-eopy of citation/temporary license 
2. ^Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit. 
3. • Traffic accident report. 
4. D Other documents (specify) / / / r e * 7T6J- /2E<s*h / <bJS6<_ ULT 
V&4£ trrtouuk -fester f&»~r£ / ^ A ) 
D a t « ^ / - / f - £ ^ Tim> *>/da Rapftrt was completed. IV. 
UTHORIZED ENDORSING SIGNATURE 
certify and swear that I am a sworn Utah peace officer and that I have prepared the above report form and thai 
le information on the report form and the attached documents are true and correct to my knowledge and beliel 
nd that the report form was prepared in the regular course of my duties. It is my belief the subject was in vioiatior 
f section 41-6-44 U.C.A. at the date, time and place specified iivfhis report. 
j&L 
Signature of Peace Officer 
Law Enforcement Agency: /(//.f^fa 
TATEOFUTAH^. ., . y I S S . 
IOUNTY OF ^Cf(f- /<*&/&* ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / ' day of \J&*n 
Date: A / ^ / ? r Time:__j2£a5-
l , J^J**n ^ 1 9 i ^ s 
NOTARY PUBLIC
 f ^ n * 
Residing at: £sejt~ 3c**fe* 
Ay Commission Expires: 
The original of this form must be sent within five (5) days of the arrest of thevsubject to: 
Officer of Driver License Services 
4501 South 2700 West 










INTOXIf YZER PRINT CODE 
A - A I R BLANK 
B - BREATH 
C - CALIBRATOR (Simulator) 
OBSERVED SUBJECT 
FOR REOUIRED OBSERVATION 





O P E R A T O R ' « 
v 0> 
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1 * ?- /S> 9 
I N I T I A L 
I / / ^ A . | 
L O C A T I O N 
^r^ 
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District Court Findings and Conclusions 
DAVID L. WILKINSON, No. 3472 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
BRUCE M. HALE, No 1298 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
A t t o r n e y s f o r R e s p o n d e n t 
Room 236 S t a t e C a p i t o l 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 533-7606 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROD N. TRIPLETT, ) 
P e t i t i o n e r , ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
VS. ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) AND ORDER 
FRED C. SCHWENDIRAN, C h i e f , ) 
D r i v e r L i c e n s e S e r v i c e s , ) Case No. C85-1105 
D e p a r t m e n t of P u b l i c S a f e t y , ) 
S t a t e of U t a h , ) 
R e s p o n d e n t . ) 
T h i s m a t t e r h a v i n g come b e f o r e t h e C o u r t on S e p t e m b e r 
5 , 1 9 8 6 , and t h e p a r t i e s b e i n g r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
c o u n s e l and t h e C o u r t h a v i n g r e c e i v e d and r e v i e w e d t h e r e c o r d of 
t h e D e p a r t m e n t of P u b l i c S a f e t y , S t a t e of Utah and a d m i n i s -
t r a t i v e h e a r i n g i n t h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r , and p l a i n t i f f ' s 
c o m p l a i n t a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e O f f i c e of D r i v e r L i c e n s e S e r v i c e s was 
a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i c i o u s under t h e Utah O p e r a t o r 1 s L i c e n s e A c t , 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 4 1 - 2 - 1 9 . 6 and 4 1 - 2 - 2 0 , t h e C o u r t b e i n g f u l l y 
a p p r i s e d i n t h e p r e m i s e s now makes i t s : 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 . The C o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e a g e n c y r e c o r d shows t h a t 
t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l , c o m p e t e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s 
Azi 
of the hearing off icer of the Department of Public Safety. There 
i s a residuum of evidence and the Court finds that the p la in t i f f 
was l e g a l l y arrested for "driving under the influence of a lco-
hol ." 
2 . The Court further finds that a l l of the elements of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6 were proven before the Agency. The 
Court spec i f i ca l ly finds that the evidence before the Agency i s 
competent and shows that the arresting off icer had reasonable 
grounds to believe that p la int i f f may have been in v io la t ion of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44, arrested him, requested that he take an 
intoxilyzer t e s t , and advised the p la in t i f f that a result indi -
cating a blood alcohol content, by weight, of .08% or more shall 
and can result in the suspension or revocation of the person's 
l i cense or privi lege to operate a motor vehic le , that a chemical 
t e s t Was voluntari ly agreed to by p la in t i f f , and that i t was 
properly given by a cer t i f i ed operator showing re l iably a result 
of .08% or above of alcohol by weight in p l a i n t i f f ' s blood. 
3. The Court further finds that the DUI report was 
properly signed, notarized, countersigned and forwarded to the 
Office of Driver License Services within f ive days of the arrest , 
that p la in t i f f requested a timely hearing which was held with the 
p l a i n t i f f , as well as the o f f i cer , offering sworn testimony. 
4. The hearing was granted prior to 30 days from the 
date of the arrest , and the statute grants the p la in t i f f the 
opportunity to appeal to th i s Court for a hearing on the record 
- 2 -
A 2/2-
and a determination of whether or not the Department was a r b i -
t r a r y or capr ic ious . 
5 . The a r r e s t i ng of f icer gave sworn testimony before 
the Department t o the contents of the DUI Report Form and h i s 
grounds t o bel ieve t h a t the p e t i t i o n e r was dr iving while under 
the inf luence . The Court f inds tha t he was c e r t i f i e d to give 
breath t e s t s with the i n tox i l yze r , t ha t he used a checkl i s t and 
had no problems with the machine. The in tox i lyze r machine was 
checked t o show tha t i t was working properly on January 15 , 1985, 
by a c e r t i f i e d breath t e s t t echnic ian . The pe t i t i one r tooJc an 
in tox i lyze r examination on t h a t machine on January 19, 1985. 
The Court f inds tha t no subsequent t e c h n i c i a n ' s 
a f f i dav i t was presented t o the hearing of f icer to show tha t the 
i n tox i lyze r machine was checked after the t e s t adminis t ra t ion . 
The Court, f inds t h a t the hearing off icer could reasonably 
presume'the machine to s t i l l be r e l i a b l e and in working order and 
the r e s u l t s were the re fo re , properly admissible before the 
admin is t ra t ive department without the fur ther foundation of a 
l a t e r t e s t of the machine. 
6. Pursuant to § 41-2-19.6 the p l a i n t i f f ' s l i cense was 
suspended. The p l a i n t i f f appealed tha t adverse decision to t h i s 
Courx for a review pursuant t o Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-2-19.6 and 
41-2-20. 
Having made the foregoing f indings of f a c t , the Court 
now makes i t s : 
- 3 -
A 2S 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes t ha t there was s u b s t a n t i a l 
competent evidence to support the Depar tments determination t o 
s u s t a i n the Notice of In ten t ion to Suspend p l a i n t i f f ' s p r i v i l ege 
t o operate a veh ic le in the S t a t e of Utah served upon p l a i n t i f f 
when he was a r r e s t ed due process was granted. 
2 . There was competent evidence to support the 
Adminis t ra t ive f ind ings , and the Court concludes t ha t the 
hearing of f ice r had reasonable grounds t o bel ieve tha t the 
p l a i n t i f f may have been in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 41*6-44, 
and in add i t i on , t ha t there were r e l i a b l e t e s t r e s u l t s which 
ind ica ted a blood alcohol content of .08% or g rea te r in the 
p l a i n t i f f , or t ha t the p l a i n t i f f had been operat ing a motor 
veh ic le under the inf luence of alcohol rendering him incapable 
of safely dr iving the same. 
3 . The Court concludes t h a t the in tox i lyze r machine 
was r e l i a b l e and the r e s u l t s admissible before the Department, 
pursuant t o the presumption se t for th in Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-
44.5 ana 44 .3 , and Murray City v. Ha l l , 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 
1983): Yacht Club v. Ut. Liquor Control Corner 681 P.2d 1227 (Utah 
1 9 8 4 ) . 
4. The Court fur ther concludes t h a t , under the d e f i n i -
t i o n s of a r b i t r a r y and capr ic ious given in Utah Department of 
Administrat ive Services v. Public Service Commission, 65 8 P.2d 
601, the Department of Publ ic S a f e t y ' s decis ion was not a r b i t r a r y 
or cap r i c ious . 
- 4 -
A 2*4 
The Court having made the foregoing f indings of fact 
and conclus ions of law f now makes the f o l l o w i n g : 
ORDER 
1 . The dec i s ion of the Department of Publ ic Safe ty f 
Office of Driver License S e r v i c e s , i s sus ta ined and p l a i n t i f f ' s 
dr iv ing p r i v i l e g e s are to be suspended or revoked as required by 
law* 
DATED t h i s Q%n day of J]**- # 1 9 8 ^ 
Approved as to form: 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO 
Attorney for P e t i t i o n e r 
DISTRICT CbtJRT JUDGE 
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stances of their preparation were such as 
to indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the stan-
dards established under subsection (1) 
and the provisions of subsection (2) have 
been met, there shall be a presumption 
that the test results are valid and further 
foundation for introduction of the evi-
dence is unnecessary. 
[ l l f 12] Section 41-6-44.3 is merely a 
codification of the findings necessary to 
establish a proper foundation for the intro-
duction of breathalyzer evidence. It is a 
legislative recognition of the universal ac-
ceptance of the reliability of such evidence. 
Cf.t e.g., People v. (Sower, 42 N.Y.2d 117, 
397 N.Y.Sid 368, 366 N.E.2d 69 (1977) (dis-
cussing the widespread acceptance of the 
reliability of the breathalyzer). The enact-
ment of § 41-6-44.3 evinces an intent by 
the Legislature to relieve the State of Utah 
and other governmental entities of the fi-
nancial burden of calling as a witness in 
every DUI case the public officer responsi-
ble for testing the accuracy of the breatha-
lyzer equipment The accuracy of the 
breathalyzer equipment depends on both 
the proper functioning of the breathalyzer 
machine itself and the proper compounding 
of chemicals in the ampoules. The regula-
tions enacted by the Commissioner of Public 
Safety pursuant to § 41-6-44.3(1) require 
both a calibration of the machine and a 
testing of the ampoules. Thus, in place of 
the officer's testimony, § 41-6-44.3 permits 
the admission of affidavits regarding the 
3. The appellant contends that § 41-6-443 is 
inapplicable to the ampoules. We disagree. 
The ampoules are such an integral part of the 
breathalyzer equipment that § 41-6—44.3 
would serve no purpose if it did not encompass 
the ampoules. 
4. The dissent claims that such findings are im-
plicit or that the burden was on the defendant 
to take exception thereto. The defendant did 
object at the trial level to the admission of the 
breathalyzer results on the basis of lack of 
foundation. Furthermore, § 41-6-443(3) 
states that, before the court will presume the 
validity of the breathalyzer results, a judge 
must find compliance with subsections (1) and 
(2). We will not imply such findings, especially 
when the admission of evidence under § 41-6-
44.3 intrudes upon an accused's constitutional 
maintenance df a specific breathalyzer as 
evidence of tbfc proper functioning of that' 
breathalyzer machine and the accuracy of 
the ampoules.* However, prior to the ac-
ceptance of those affidavits to establish a 
presumption of the validity of the test re-
sults, § 41-6-44.3 requires an affirmative 
finding by the trial court that (1) the calib-
ration and testing for accuracy of the 
breathalyzer and the ampoules were per-
formed in accordance with the standards 
established by the Commissioner of Public 
Safety, (2) the affidavits were prepared in 
the regular course of the public officer's 
duties, (3) tha| they were prepared contem-
poraneously i i th the act, condition or 
event, and (4) the "source of information 
from which rriade and the method and cir-
cumstances of their preparation were such 
as to indicate their trustworthiness." The 
record is devoid of any such findings.4 In 
fact, the agreed statement of the facts 
states that *|[n}o testimony was elicited 
with respect t^> the accuracy of the machine 
or the trustworthiness of the chemicals 
used." Moreover, the affidavits proffered 
as evidence ii> satisfaction of the require-
ments of § 4J—6—44.3 are inadmissible be-
cause they show on their face that the 
affiants do ndt attest from their own per-
sonal knowledge.* 
Consequently, the results of the breatha-
lyzer tests were erroneously admitted be-
cause they lacked proper foundation. The 
conviction and judgment of the trial court 
are therefore vacated and set aside and the 
case is remanded for a new trial. 
right of confrontation. Moreover, the affida-
vits in this case pertaining to the testing of the 
breathalyzer on September 4th and 12th of 
1979 were subscribed and sworn to on Septem* 
ber 26, 1979, thereby showing that they were 
not prepared contemporaneously with the test-
ing of the breathalyzer as required by the stat-
ute. 
5. The dissent suggests that the affiants do at-
test from personal knowledge. The affidavits 
state that Ihe breathalyzer "was properly 
checked according to the standards established 
by the Utah J>epanment of Public Safety 
Nowhere do the affiants state their basis for 
that statement. They do not state that they 
personally performed the testing. Absent such 




On remand for a new trial, we are re-
quired to "pass upon and determine all 
questions of law involved in the case 
presented on appeal and necessary to the 
final determination of the case." Utah 
R.Civ.R 76(a). We therefore address the 
appellant's claims regarding hearsay and 
his constitutional right of confrontation. 
Section 41-6-44.3 appears to be pat-
terned after the "Business Entries" excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. See Utah R.Evid. 
63(13). See generally A. Polasky & F. Paul-
son, Business Entries—From Common Law 
to the New Uniform Rules of Evidence 
(With a Glance at the Utah Development), 4 
Utah LRev. 327 (1955). Both § 41-6-44.3 
and Rule 63(13) require that the document 
or memorandum' be prepared in the regular 
course of the public officer's duties or busi-
ness and that it be prepared contemporane-
ously with the act, condition or event In 
addition, both require that the "source [or 
sources] of information from which rnade 
and the method and circumstances of their 
preparation were such as to indicate their 
trustworthiness." See U.C.A., 1953, § 41-
6-44.3; Utah RJBvid. 63(13). Thus, § 41-
6-44.3 appears to be a specific codification 
of the business entries exception to the 
hearsay rule. 
[13] We hold that, so long as there is 
compliance with the mandates of the stat-
ute, namely, contemporaneous preparation 
in accordance with established standards, in 
the regular course of the officer's duties, 
and indications of trustworthiness, the affi-
davits regarding the maintenance of a 
breathalyzer machine are admissible under 
§ 41-6-44.3 as a valid statutory exception 
to the hearsay rule. As such, those affida-
vits establish a rebuttable presumption that 
the breathalyzer machine was functioning 
properly. See U.C.A., 1953, § 41-6-44.3(3). 
Our conclusion is supported by similar deci-
sions in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., West-
er v. St*te, Alaska, 528 P.2d 1179 (1974); 
Stale v. Hudes, 128 N J.Super. 589, 321 A.2d 
275 (1974); State v. Walker, 53 Ohio St2d 
192, 374 N.E.2d 132 (1978); State v. Wood-
ward, 1 Or.App. 338, 462 P.2d 685 (1969). 
T r. HALL Utah IS21 
14 (Utah 1»63) 
[14] The appellant also claims that 
§ 41-6-44.3 permits the introduction of evi-
dence in violation of his constitutional right 
of confrontation. Although we have decid-
ed that § 41-6-44.3 is a valid statutory 
exception to the hearsay rule, introduction 
of evidence under § 41-6-44.3 may still be 
in violation of an accused's constitutional 
right of confrontation. See State v. Ander-
son, Utah, 612 P^d 778, 785 n. 31 (1980) 
(citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 
S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)). With 
respect to the right of confrontation, this 
Court has stated: 
Classically, the primary object of the 
constitutional right of confrontation is to 
prevent depositions and ex parte affida-
vits from being used against the accused 
at trial in lieu of a persona) examination 
and cross-examination of the witness 
against him. When confrontation is 
available the accused has an opportunity, 
not only of testing the recollection and 
sifting the conscience of the witness, but 
of compelling him to stand face-to-face 
with the jury in order that they may look 
at him and judge by his demeanor and 
the manner in which he gives his testimo-
ny whether he is worthy of belief. En-
compassed in this right of confrontation 
is the procedural right of cross-examina-
tion and the recognition of certain proce-
dural rights regarding the exclusion of 
extra judicial [sic] statements, similar to 
those found protected by evidentiary 
rules excluding hearsay evidence. 
State v. Anderson, supra, at 785 (citations 
omitted). However, it is well recognized 
that the accused's right of confrontation is 
not absolute. See, e.g., State v. Maestas, 
Utah, 564 P.2d 1386 (1977). In certain in~ 
stances, it must yield to legitimate govern-
mental interests. See, e.g, State v. Walker, 
supra, 53 Ohio St2d at 199, 374 N.E2d at 
136-37. 
[15] The enactment of § 41-6-44.3 
manifests an intent by the Legislature^to 
relieve the State of Utah and other govern-
mental entities of the financial burden and* 
inconvenience of calling as a witness in 
every DUI case the public officer responsi-
ble for testing the accuracy of the breatha-
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Jyzer machine and the ampoules. See 
Stroupe v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 243, 207 
S.E.2d 894 (1974). Such a concern is a 
legitimate eovemmental interest Section 
41-6-44.3, devised to further that interest, 
constitutes a very limited intrusion upon an 
accused's right of confrontation. The stat-
ute does not make the documents conclusive 
evidence that the breathalyser was func-
tioning properly. See U.CJL, 1953, § 41^"" 
6-44.3(3). In fact if an accused feels that 
the machine was not functioning properly 
or wants to prove noncompliance with the 
standards established by the Commissioner 
of Public Safety, he/she can subpoena the 
public officer responsible for testing the 
accuracy of the breathalyzer and the am-
poules. See U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-14. See 
also Stroupe v. Commonwealth, supra. If 
the appellant wished to challenge the accu-
racy of the breathalyzer in this case, he 
could have subpoenaed or taken the deposi-
tion of the person who calibrated the 
breathalyzer and tested the ampoules in 
question. The appellant apparently chose 
not to do so. 
Thus, given (I) the legitimate govern-
mental interest in not having to produce in 
every DUI case the public officer responsi-
ble for testing the accuracy of the breatha-
lyzer and the ampoules, and (2) the alterna-
tive means available to an accused to cross-
examine and confront such a witness, we 
hold that § 41-6-44.3 does not violate the 
appellant's constitutional right of confron-
tation when all of its requirements are met 
See State v. Walker, supra. See also People 
v. Tenorio, 197 Colo. 137,590 PJ2d 952 (1979) 
(stating that there is no violation of an 
Accused's right of confrontation where the 
evidence is shown to be trustworthy and 
reliable). However, as previously discussed, 
the mandate of § 41-6-44.3 was not met in 
the present case. Therefore, the results of 
the breathalyzer test were erroneously ad-
mitted. 
III. 
[16] The appellant's final assertion of 
error regarding the prosecution's failure to 
identify the appellant as being the perpe-
trator of the critne charged is not reviewa-
ble. It raises an issue of sufficiency of the 
evidence rather than a question of constitu-
tional dimension. Therefore, the district 
court's decision thereon is final and is not 
reviewable by this Court See State v. Tay-
lor, Utah, 664 ?M 439 (1983); Utah Const 
art VIII, § 9;| U.CJL, 1953, § 78-3-5 
"(Supp.1981). I 
The judgment of the trial court is re-
versed and the case is remanded for a new 
trial in accordance with this opinion. 
OAKS and HOjWE, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J.,| concurs in the result 
HALL, Chief Justice (concurring and dis-
senting): 
I join the Court in upholding the constitu-
tionality of the challenged statutes and or-
dinances. However, I do not agree that 
defendant is entitled to a new trial. 
In granting a new trial, the majority of 
the Court reaches out and decides an issue 
not raised at trijal nor raised on appeal. 
With the exception of the unmeritorious 
identification issue, defendants contentions 
on appeal are directed solely to the constitu-
tionality of U.CpL, 1953, § 41-6-44.3. 
which permits the! introduction of documen-
tary evidence of acts, conditions or events 
to prove the accuracy of the instrument 
commonly referred to as the "breathalyz-
er." Defendant attacks the statute on the 
grounds that it denies the rights of confron-
tation and equal protection. 
Defendant has rtever contended that the 
documentary evidence failed to meet the 
foundational requirements of the statute, or 
that the trial court failed to make the find-
ings required by t^e statute before receiv-
ing the evidence bearing upon the accuracy 
of the "breathalyzer." No such issue hav-
ing been raised atj trial, and no issue per-
taining thereto having been raised on this 
appeal, 1 do not agree with the majority of 
the Court that "th* record is devoid of any 
such findings." Oh the contrary, it is im-
plicit in the record before us that the trial 
judge made such findings and thereby satis-
fied himself that the proper foundation had 
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sn laid for the introduction of the breath-
e r evidence. Furthermore, it was not 
aimbent upon the court, by statute or 
lerwise, to make written findings, and 
en if he did not vocalize his findings in 
pport of his decision to admit the evi-
nce, it was incumbent upon the defendant 
take exception thereto, if for no other 
ison than to dispel any notion of invited 
•or. 
I am also unable to follow the reasoning 
the majority that the affidavits prof-
red in evidence were inadmissible since 
ey were not made from the standpoint of 
rsonal knowledge. My reading of the 
fidavits reveals that they were executed 
the three Highway Patrol troopers who 
rformeo the testing of the breathalyzer 
r accuracy and that they were executed in 
eir capacity as "Breath test technicians." 
they did not personally perform the test-
g, their affidavits at least support the 
ct that they personally observed the per-
rmance of the tests by others. In any 
ent, the sufficiency of the affidavits not 
>ving been challenged in the trial court, 
at issue is not before the Court.1 
In regard to the assertion of the majority 
at § 41-6-44.3 requires documentary evi-
nce to be prepared contemporaneously 
ith the testing of the "breathalyzer,*' I 
rid no such provision therein. What is 
quired by the statute is set forth in sub-
ctions (2) and (3), which read as follows: 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which 
it is material to prove that a person was 
driving or in actual physical control of a 
vehicle while under the influence of alco-
hol or driving with a blood alcohol con-
tent of .10% or greater, documents of-
fered as memoranda or records of acts, 
conditions or events to prove that the 
analysis and accuracy of the instrument 
were made pursuant to standards estab-
lished in subsection (1) shall be admissible 
if: 
(a) The judge finds that they were 
made in the regular course of the in-
vestigation at or about the time of the 
act, condition or event; and 
Franklin Financial v. Ponderosa Associates, 
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(b) The source of the information fr 
which made and the method and t 
cumstances of their preparation w< 
such as to indicate their trust wort 
ness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standai 
established under subsection (1) and 1 
provisions of subsection (2) have be 
met, there shall be a presumption tl 
the test results are valid and furt) 
foundation for introduction of evidence 
unnecessary. [Emphasis added.] 
I would affirm the judgment of the tr 
co^rt in its entirety. 
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Defendant was convicted in the Four 
District Court, Juab County, Allen B. Sc 
ensen, J., of attempted first-degree murde 
and he appealed. The Supreme Cour 
Howe, J., held that evidence was insufi 
cient to sustain conviction. 
Conviction and sentence set aside. 
Hall, CJ., dissented and filed opinioi 
1. Homicide *=>256 
To sustain information accusing d< 
fendant of attempted first-degree murdc 
for purpose of avoiding or preventing ai 
rest, State had burden to prove beyon 
et Ml., Utah, 659 ?2d )O40 (1983). 
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